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1. INTRODUCTION
Test System Impact on
System Availability
L.F. PAU, Senior Member, IEEE
Technical University of Denmark
The specifications are presented for an imperfect automatic test
system (ATS) (test frequency distribution, reliability, false alarm
rate, nondetection rate) in order to account for the availability,
readiness, mean time between unscheduled repairs (MTBUR),
reliability, and maintenance of the system subject to monitoring and
test. A time-dependent Markov model is presented, and applied in
three cases, with examples of numerical results provided for
preventive maintenance decisions, design of an automatic test
system, buffer testing in computers, and data communications.
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Much of the current debate around self-testing
amounts to design system architectures (both in hardware
and software) such that the unit under test (UUT) can be
tested or monitored at selected points in time, by a
monitoring and test system (ATS) subject to the same
causes of hazards. If the ATS continuously monitors the
UUT, the joint system (ATS + UUT) will have a
reliability less than the smallest of the ATS and UUT
reliabilities. If the ATS never controls the UUT, the
failures of the latter may go unnoticed. However, the
UUT failures may be mistaken for ATS failures,
especially if the ATS reliability is not maximum. For cost
reasons and others, it may not be justifiable to design the
ATS with the highest possible reliability.
Many real life examples, especially from avionics,
communications, and electronics, teach us that self-testing
requires a well-balanced tradeoff between UUT
reliability, ATS reliability, and the test strategy.
In terms of a sensitivity analysis, it is now especially
dangerous to disregard the ATS reliability, when
evaluating the system availability. The issues addressed
are all related to the effects of an imperfect test system
on the availability of the system under test, with its
associated on-line monitoring and test system (ATS). The
testing of the system/UUT is assumed to be a random
checkout policy with a known probability distribution.
The main imperfections accounted for are: 1) UUT
reliability, 2) test system reliability, 3) false alarm rate of
the test system, 4) nondetection rate of the test system,
and 5) losses affecting the transmission of the alarms.
Moreover, independent of the technique used for
failure diagnosis or detection, it is essential to investigate
the effects of the maintenance and removal policies on
this same system availability, in the presence of an
imperfect monitoring and test system. Maintenance may
in this context be restricted to repair, or to simple error
correction, and the duration is characterized by a known
probability distribution. The four classes of maintenance
actions considered here are 1) on-site (or fast) repair after
a failure has been detected by the test system, 2) off-site
(or slow) repair after a failure has been detected by the
test system, 3) withdrawal of UUT from service because
of replacement, and 4) pulling down UUT for possible
test after removal.
Finally, after unscheduled maintenance, repair, or
error correction, which are here assumed to be without
defects, the systems may be stored on-site or off-site. The
same happens in case of withdrawal from service. The
storage time distributions are supposed to be known.
Preventive maintenance is carried out after a fixed
duration (or number of cycles) T, also called life length.
No single general model is known to take into
account the imperfections of the test and monitoring
system. Only inspection errors in quality control have
been considered [10], although a number of works have
been dealing with models of preventive maintenance and
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system reliability [2, 5, 8, 15], or failure detection and
diagnosis [13, 14] and automatic test systems [9].
The model proposed here is of wide applicability in
terms of on-line test and monitoring systems, with
obviously different orders of magnitude for all parameters
involved: avionics [1, 11], telecommunications, control
systems, manufacturing lines, computer systems, and
integrated circuits [16]. Should the restrictions used here
to deal with the time-dependent Markov model of a
single-unit repairable system not hold, or should the on-
line monitoring and testing not be random, there is
literature to cover such specific extensions.
II. OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE
PROCEDURES
These procedures are schematized in Fig. 1. We
define rl as the probability of detecting correctly the
system failure with an operating ATS, r2 as the
probability of assigning a faulty UUT to off-site repair,
rather than on-site repair, r3 as the probability of putting
back into operational storage (condition E7) a system
which was just pulled-down incorrectly, rather than
testing it (condition El), and r4 as the probability that the
ATS identifies correctly the UUT as being operational.
A. System Or Unit Under Test (UUT)
The system is assumed to operate according to
specifications until one of the following circumstances
happens:
1) The system undergoes a test or check-out (without
removal), which is performed with an automatic test
and monitoring system (ATS). During this test the
UUT does not operate according to specifications and
the test sequences are randomly distributed over time
with a rate tl (t).
2) The system is improperly pulled down for
accessability considerations due to other equipments; it
is not left in pulled-down position (no holding time),
and either tested by the ATS or assigned to on-site
storage in a random way.
3) The system is withdrawn from service because of
replacement, or of aging, and goes to off-site storage
without test.
Finally, the UUT is assumed to operate correctly
again after the end of the test sequence, assuming that no
failure has been detected.
B. Test And Monitoring System (ATS)
1) The test and monitoring system tests the UUT, while
it operates, at the rate fiol(t), and tests also the UUT
when it has been improperly pulled down.
2) If no failure is detected by the ATS, either after
checkout or removal, the system is put back into
operational status.
3) The test and monitoring unit will deliver a negative
output, or alarm, in either of the following 2 cases:
a) The ATS itself has failed and the ATS has the
reliability function G(t) (See [20]).
b) The ATS has not failed, but either the UUT is
r3 Be03
Fig. 1. Markov state diagram for UUT and its test system, with corresponding maintenance actions: y(t) = 1
G(t)r1(1- F(t)), and [i10(t) = 1 - y(t) [(1 -r2) L14 + r2 .1f5.
TE : y (t)
(1-r2 ) vG(t)( 1r4
G(t) + G(t) 1 - r4)F(t) +
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operating correctly, and the operating ATS has
detected a failure (false alarm), or the UUT has a
failure, and the ATS has detected it, although there
is a nondetection probability; the UUT has the
reliability function F(t).
The two cases in 3)b) above are illustrated by the
decision table for the ATS detection system, which
relates the detected UUT condition with its true
condition, in which (see Fig. 2)
1
-rl nondetection probability
I - r4 _ false alarm rate.
State of UUT detected
by ATE
No failure
Probability,
F(t)
Failure
Probabili ty,
1- FIt))
True state
of UUT
No failure Failure
Fig. 2. Decision table for ATS detection problem for UUT.
Nondetection rate is 1 - r; false alarm rate is 1 - r4; UUT reliability
is F(t).
C. Maintenance And Repair
If the ATS has delivered an alarm, the UUT will
undergo either on-site (or fast) repair, or off-site (or slow)
repair. After repair, the UUTs are stored in one of two
possible inventories before being returned into service.
No account is made of storage or maintenance induced
failures.
D. Remarks
Please note that in the above procedure, and in the
model of Section III, all operating and maintenance
procedures are assumed to have no memory, which is
often the case for electronic systems.
Also, we assume that the repair times are exponential,
the inter-test times are Markovian, and all event types are
mutually independent.
Should some specific applications not match these
restrictive assumptions, a number of generalizations to
more complex reliability problems can be found in the
literature [17, 18, 19].
I11. MODEL
To describe the process outlined in Section II, we
propose a continuous time Markov model, with time-
dependent coefficients and transition rates (see [4, 6]).
State Probabilities (see Fig. 1): Let pi(t) be the
probability for the system (ATS and UUT) to be in one
of the following eight states:
EO: System (UUT) in operational status; a failure is
the condition Eo.
El: System under test without removal (UUT failed
or not).
E2: System withdrawn from service because of
replacement; goes at once to E6.
E3: System improperly pulled-down, with possible
test after removal, or on-site storage.
E4: On-site (fast) repair after negative test outcome.
E: Off-site (slow) overhaul after negative test
outcome.
E6: Off-site storage of UUT in operational status
(identical to E2).
E7: On-site storage of UUT in operational status.
Please note that the states E2 and E6 are identical
computationally, though not when specifying the
maintenance procedures.
Transition rates: We define the following transition
rates, where all limits are for At-> 0
Reliability
XU(t) = lim Pr(E0 -- Eo during (t, t+ At(|Eo at t)/
At represents the time-dependent failure rate
of the UUT corresponding to F(t).
XAT(t) - lim Probability of an ATS failure during the
interval (t,t + At(. given it was operating at
time t)/At).
Testing
(t) = lim Pr(E0 -- El during (t, t + At(|E( at t)/
At represents the rate at which the UUT is
being connected to the ATS without pull-
down.
ptl0(t) = lim Pr(El -* EO during (t,t+At(IkE at t)/
At represents the rate at which the UUT is
being put back into service in case of
positive test outcome (no failure) (see
Section IIB 3).
= lim Pr(E0 -* B2 during (t,t + At((EO at t)/
At represents the rate at which an operating
UUT is being removed from service for
replacement, or because of aging, or
because of preventive maintenance at time
T; iL02 iS time dependent because of aging.
[103 = lim Pr(E0-* E3 during (t, t+At(I Eo at t)/
At represents the rate at which an
operational system is being improperly
pulled down.
Maintenance
[ -14 lim Pr(El -* E4 during (t,t + At( E1 at t)/
At represents the rate at which a system
under test, eligible for maintenance due to
the outcome of the test, can be repaired on-
site (fast repair).
= lim Pr(E, - ES during (t t+At(1B1 at t)/
At represents the rate at which a system
under test, eligible for maintenance due to
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the outcome of the test, can be repaired off-
site (slow repair).
[126 = 1 expresses that all UUT removed for
replacement go to off-site storage, as E2 and
E6 are identical states computationally.
[160 = lim Pr(E6 -* Eo during (t, t + At( E6 at t)/
A/t represents the rate at which an
operational system stored off-site is being
put back into service.
70. 'It= lim Pr(E7 -* EO during (t,t+ At(|E7 at t)/
At represents the rate at which an
operational system stored on-site is being
put back into service.
A. Exogeneous Probabilities
Due to reliability considerations, or in connection
with the maintenance organization, the following
probabilities are defined:
F(t) = exp( -f XAu(x) dx): UUT reliability
G(t) = exp (fSXT(x) dx): ATS reliability.
One can then compute the probability y(t) for the test and
monitoring unit to deliver an alarm, based on the
outcomes listed in Section IIB:
y(t) = Pr(ATS output = alarm at time t) (1)
y(t) = 1 - G(t) + G(t) (1-r4) F(t)
+ G(t)rl (1 -F(t)).
Also, because the transition from El back to operational
status Eo can only happen if the output of the test and
monitoring system is positive (no alarm), the actual
transition rate 10lo(t) is
i10(t) = 1 - y(t) [(1 -r2)L14+r2jw15] (2)
where the second factor is the combined transition rate
from El to E4 or E15.
B. State Evolutions
The evolutions of the state probabilities pi(t) are
governed by the equations (see Fig. 1):
dt O(10 (t) + >102(t) + ko3)Po(t)
+ pLIO(0P1(t) + j.60p6(t) + 70p7(t) (3)
dit [-4lo(t) + (1 -rr2(t) L14
+ r2y(t)p15]p1 (t)
+ po 1(t)po(t) + (1 - r3)p.03p3(t) (4)
dtp1 1-PI(t) + flO(t)p6(t)dt 1
dP
= + 102(z9po(t) - p2(t)
dtP = p..03P0(t) - N03p3(t)dti
dtp4 - p4(t) + (1-r2)Y(t)lX14P(t)
dp5
-
p5(t) + r2Y(t)p115Pj(t)dti
dp6
- j60P6(t) + p5(t) + P2(t)
dtp7 - - 70p7(t) + r3V103P3(t) + p4(t)dt
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(1 1)
C. Initial Conditions
Assuming both the UUT and ATS to start an
operational life at t = 0, and the states El - E7 to be
empty:
po(0) = 1; Pi(0) = 0, i = 1,..., 7.
D. Ergodicity
The above process is ergodic if and only if there
exists one irreducible closed subset of positive persistent
states, and if all of these states are aperiodic. It can be
observed in practice that neither this criteria, nor the
following are fulfilled in all cases:
lim dpi = 0,
t-4+± dt
i = 0, ..., 7, independently of pi(O).
This lack of strong global ergodicity is essentially due to
the imperfections of the test equipment, and to I102 # 0.
Ergodicity, as well as singularity conditions, are of
secondary importance here, because we are only
interested in finite horizon numerical solutions; this finite
horizon is equal to the preventive maintenance period T.
One may easily compute, if needed, the ergodic
coefficient of the stochastic process, and follow its time
variations, and especially its convergence towards zero,
in case of weak ergodicity ([61).
E. Mean Time Between Unscheduled Repairs
Because of the preventive maintenance actions at time
T, all unscheduled repairs and the role played by the test
equipment, it is interesting to compare the mean time
between failures (MTBF) and the mean time between
unscheduled repairs (MTBUR) of the system under test:
MTBF(T) JF(t)dt
= fT (exp(- fXu(x) dx)dt
MT
J MTBUR(T) = Jpo(t)dt
(12)
(13)
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where po(t) is the solution of the stochastic process III B.
The quantity MTBF(T) for a Weibull reliability process
is studied in [ 12].
IV. APPLICATION A. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
DECISIONS
A. Criteria Applying To Preventive Maintenance
One of the following maintenance decision rules can
be considered [5]:
1) Overhaul or replace the system if it is found to be
in a state of deterioration exceeding a control limit.
2) Minimize the cost per service time unit, when the
cost of replacement or overhaul and the costs of being in
the various degraded states are taken into account
(including inspection costs).
3) Maximize the time between replacements or
overhauls subject to the assumption that the reliability
does not exceed some upper limit.
4) Minimize the life cycle costs per item, including
procurement, testing, maintenance, inspection, and
operations.
B. Cost Minimization Of The Decision Between
Unscheduled On-Site Repair And Off-Site
Overhaul
Assume that the test equipment activates an alarm at
time t, 0 . t ' T; the decision is between
E4: on-site repair at cost a,
E5: off-site overhaul at cost A, A ' a. (14;
The point is that, if preventive maintenance (i.e.,
overhaul) is mandatory at time t = T, one may want to
avoid having many repairs when an early overhaul would
extend the subsequent planned operational life of the
system [3]. Repair actions alone will not extend this
planned operational life of the system. In case of on-site
repair, this incremental cost A should be spread over
MTBUR (t + T) because of the new extended authorized
residual life T and the termination at time t of the former
one. The maintenance strategy proposed here, as related
to the operations described in Section II, is to select
between E4 or E5 the decision which minimizes the
incremental maintenance costs per unit of authorized
residual life:
E4: on-site repair at time t if alarm at t and
a A
MTBUR(T) MTBUR(t + T) (15
E5: off-site overhaul at time t, if alarm at t and
a A
MTBUR(T) MTBUR (t+ T) (16
The probability r2 becomes the ratio of the probability
of the decision E5, to the probability of the decision E4,
as reflected by the values of p5(t) and p4(t). Numerical
solutions may be obtained by forward integration, for
specified values of ,0ol(t), ji02(t), F(t), and G(t).
Examples:
1) [iol(t), test rate, is specified equal to zero over
subintervals of [0, T], corresponding to the unavailability
of an on-site ATS.
2) >02(t), removal rate, is specified equal to zero
over subintervals of [0, T], for example during the
contractual life of the equipment.
3) F(t) is a Weibull failure distribution, and G(t) =
1; numerical results are obtained in [12].
C. Partial Conclusion
Case studies of this application A, show that the ATS
performances have very significant impact on the
performance criteria values of the decision reached
according to the criteria of Sections IVA and B. One
might even sometimes claim that preventive maintenance
makes sense or not, only if the ATS meets some
reliability goals, which make that preventive policy
visible.
V. APPLICATION B. SPECIFICATION AND
DESIGN OF TEST SYSTEMS
A. Introduction
The problem of specifying jointly the reliability G(t),
testing rate p0ol(t), false alarm rate (1 - r4), and
nondetection rate (1 - r1) of a test and monitoring
system is essential for the overall operational availability
and readiness of many systems operating as described in
Section I. Moreover, these imperfections have a crucial
effect on the preventive maintenance policy.
A case example shows how the model of Section III
may help in selecting the above parameters, and carry out
a sensitivity analysis. The extreme values of the
availability po(t), as well as other probabilities can also
be obtained, and another design criteria is the
MTBUR(T).
It is essential to find out how much more reliable than
the UUT the ATS must be, or if the ATS imperfections
make preferable a random maintenance policy without
any test system. Another concern is not to maximize too
much the rate [ ol(t) at which the monitored system is
being tested, because of side-effects related to UUT
availability and also to ATS reliability and cost.
B. Standard Case
A case is selected, corresponding to rather low
reliabilities and low performances of the ATS, to enhance
the interaction aspects with the system under test:
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Reliability Test
u= 0,05 rl = 0,8
AT= 0,025 r4 = 0,8
T= 1 /k= 0,01 11O, = 0,1
Maintenance
r2 = 0,6 =14= 0,1 F115 = 0,03
r3 = 0,15
P02 = 0,001 =70 0,1 L60 = 0,1
03 = 0,001
TABLE I
Numerical Max / Min
Results Standard Case Values
Availability p0(t) 1.0 / 0.593
Testing probability p, (t) 0.1 / 0.0596
Alarm rate y(t) 0.959 / 0.234
MTBF (T) 0.194
MTBUR (T) 0,730
F(T) 0.00674
G(T) 0.0821
On-site repair p4 (t) 0.1 0.144
On-site storage p7(t) 0.1 0.0135
Off-site repair p5 (t) 0.! 0.0649
Off-site storage p6(t) 0.1 0.0103
Whereas most state probabilities have monotonous
evolutions (po decreasing; P3,P4,P5,P6,P7 - increasing),
it is extremely interesting to observe that the testing
probability Pi (t) peaks at an intermediate stage (t = 37),
and remains around Pi = 0,06 until t= T. The
replacement probability peaks also, and remains level
thereafter.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
This analysis is restricted here to single perturbations
with respect to the standard case of Section V B, and the
main results are displayed in Table IL. Complete time-
dependent plots are not possible here for lack of space.
For low ATS reliability, the testing probability Pi (t) may
have several oscillations. This also occurs if the testing
rate pt (t) is high and close to 1, where instabilities
occur.
D. Specification Of Recalibration Intervals
The model of Section II is also appropriate if the test
system is not resident close to the UUT, and represents a
calibration system. The issue is here to optimize the rate
tol(t) at which recalibration is carried out, with the
alarms corresponding to measurements out of
specifications, or to drift.
E. Partial Conclusion
It is necessary to carry out an exhaustive sensitivity
analysis about the extreme values of the availability po(t),
versus the ATS specification parameters of Section V A,
TABLE II
Application B. Specification Of The Test System Sensitivity Analysis
Testing On-site On-site
Max/Min Availability Alarm Rate Probability Storage Repair
Special Case pO(t) MTBUR(T) y(t) pI(t) p7(t) p4(t) F(T)/G(T)
r-= 0 P.o = 0,6 1.0/0.221 0.383 0.561/0.205 0.389/0.134 0.050 0.533 0.607/0.779
AT = 0.0025
XA 0.005
r2 0 1.0/0.107 0.235 0.983/0.248 0.337/0.075 0.0706 0.711 0.0067/0.0821
= 0.7
r2= 0 1.0/0.492 0.668 0.959/0.234 0.1/0.049 0.0303 0.321
r4 0.5 1.0/0.589 0.722 0.959/0.512 0.1/0.0592 0.0140 0.148
P114 = 0. 5 1.0/0.312 0.536 0.959/0.234 0.1/0.0314 0.0462 0.479
ri = 0.8 1.0/0.582 0.719 0.943/0.248 0.1/0.0584 0.0145 0.153
P60= g70 0.4 1.0/0.606 0.736 0.95910.234 0.1/0.0608 0.0036 0.146
OL0 = 0.01 1.0/0.818 0.887 0.959/0.234 0.01/0.0082 0.0017 0.0182
0k1 = 0.5 1.00.240 0.403 0.959/0.234 0.5/0.121 0.0349 0.362
XU 0.01 1.0/0.600 0.737 0.950/0.223 0.1/0.060 0.0129 0.139 0.368/0.0821
XT- 0 1.0/0.670 0.769 0.498/0.215 0.1/0.067 0.0081 0.0814 0.0067/1
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within the operational envelope of the UUT. These
variations must be further reduced, with resulting
narrowing down the specification parameter intervals, to
let the test and alarm probabilities remain within bounds
compatible with operational deployment policy.
VI. APPLICATION C. BUFFER TESTING IN
COMPUTERS AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS
A. Introduction
An interesting extension of the model in Section II, is
where the condition Eo is itself represented by a state
diagram. This is the case when the UUT is a buffer of
capacity N, subject to arrival and service processes as the
ones encountered in computers and data communications.
The test system then tests the packets arriving according
to the arrival process, e.g., by an error detection code;
error correction is either by a code (fast repair) or by
requesting the retransmission (slow repair), and only
correct or corrected packets enter the buffer.
B. Buffer Model
As a single approximation to the buffer space, we
consider a single MIMI 1 -N queue with Poisson (1)
arrival process, and independent identically distributed
(IID) (m) service process. If qk, k - 0, ..., N is the total
number of packets in the buffer number k, the steady-
state distribution is
= pk(l - p)/(l - pN+2) p A 1/m. (17)
The mean number of packets in the buffer is:
N+ 1
N , kqk (18)k=G
and the mean waiting time is:
W= T- (1/rm) (19)
where T is the mean time spent in the buffer. The
following formula are found in the steady-state case:
N - [p-(N+2)pN+2
(20)+ (N+ 1)pN+31]/(1 -p)(1 -pN+2)
T = (1/rm) + (p/m(l-p))
- (N+ 1)pN+±/(m(1- pN+)). (21)
The blocking probability, that is the probability that a
packet arrives to a full buffer, after which it is lost, is
(22)qN+l = pN l(1 -p)/(1 -pN+ ).
In the time-dependent case, the equations for the
process are, for an arrival process Poisson (LT)
dqo = - LTqo + m q1
-It
(23)
d-t LAqi-1-qi)
+ m(qi+1 -q), i = 1, ..., N- 1
dqt
-=4qLT4-1 mqN
(24)
(25)
with the initial condition qo(0) = 1, qi(0) - 0,
i = 1, ..., N.
C. Failure Detection
If the arriving packets are tested by the ATS prior to
entering the buffer, the actual arrival process concerns
only corrected or correct packets, with the actual arrival
rate:
LT(t) = PO(t) (26)
which depends on the states of the UUT and of the ATS.
The measurement of LT(t) is the subject of [7]. The
original arrival process is Poisson (L).
An alarm may now be initiated by the test system if
there is a loss of information, that is, if some packets are
lost. This supplements the other failure modes related to
errors in the packets, or to the hardware of the UUT or
ATS (see Section 11B3). As a consequence, the
probability of alarm y(t) must incorporate the blocking
probability for the N-buffer:
(27)YN(t) = '(t) + qN+ 1 (t).
Thus, the buffer condition will directly affect the test
system depending on the traffic load, when YN replaces y
in the equations of Section III A.
D. Numerical Example
Because of numerical instability, the integration step
for the joint system of differential systems of Sections
IIIB and VIB must be reduced to At/10.
Reliability Test Buffer
Xu = 0.001 rl = 1 - 106 N= 3
AT = 0.001 r4 = 1 10-8 L = 0,2
T= 1 At=0,01 > - 0,8 m = 0,2
Maintenance
r2 = °
r3 = ° j15 0 Re14 0,6
Ann3 0 -1 V40 =
P,03 -
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TABLE III
Numerical Results: Standard Case Min / Max Values
Availability po(t) 0,112 1.0
MTBF (T) 0,304
MTBUR (T) 0,875
F(T) 0,905
G(T) 0,905
Alarm rate YN(t) 0,002 0,182
Testing probability P, (t) 0.097 / 0,444
On-site storage p7(t) 0 / 0,0078
On-site repair p4(t) 0 / 0,783
Blocking probability qN, 1 (t) 0 / 0,0217
Effective arrival rate L(t) 0,022 / 0,20
The numerical results (Table III) indicate rather high
"maximum alarm rates" due to the values of XT and rj.
E. Partial Conclusion
The error-detection and error-correction schemes
selected, with corresponding resulting alarm rates, must
be adapted to buffer size and to the traffic arrival process.
VIl. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a time-dependent Markov model
describing jointly a system subject to random testing, and
its associated test and monitoring system. The emphasis
is on the imperfections of the test system, such as
reliability, false alarm, and nondetection rate, and on
their implications on the overall system availability,
readiness and maintenance. It is shown through examples
that the testing probability as well as the alarm rate,
exhibit time-dependent oscillations, the extremes of which
must be known. Tradeoffs must also be made between
the system and test system reliabilities.
Application A deals with the application of the model
to preventive maintenance decisions. Application B is a
numerical analysis of the specification and design of a
testing system. Application C covers buffer testing in
computers and data communications. Here the operational
state is itself subdivided, and the alarm rate is triggered
also by the loss of information entering the buffer.
The main conclusions of this study are the following.
1) It is now possible to specify the ATS reliability in
view of the UUT reliability and system availability, for
given ATS failure detection performances.
2) It is necessary to take into account time-dependent
evolutions of a number of test parameters in order to
guarantee worst-case designs.
3) It is now possible to relate directly the test
probability in self-testing systems to the overall system
availability.
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